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Foreword
In modem times, governments almost invariably invoke the concept
of national security to justify restrictions on the rights and freedoms of
persons subject to their jurisdiction. The claimed threat to national se-
curity varies--external attack or subversion, internal unrest and vio-
lence, and economic crisis are commonly cited menaces. Sometimes,
governments will claim multiple threats of a highly diffuse nature to
justify wholesale suspension of the constitutional order.
Ironically, the power of the ideology of liberalism and human rights
has led to the dominance of national security as the rationale for re-
pressive measures. In the past, racial or religious superiority, divine
right, or scientific authority were the dominant justifications for tyr-
anny or repression. The triumph of liberalism as the accepted language
of international discourse rendered these justifications rhetorically ob-
solete. Liberalism allows restraints on freedom only on the basis of
widely shared and compelling public interest that transcends the partic-
ular interests or claims of the ruling elite. The concept of national se-
curity meets liberalism's requirements. It invokes the interests of the
nation, the widest community under a government's jurisdiction, and it
appeals to security, the most compelling of all public interests.
Modem constitutions and international human rights instruments
recognize the legitimacy of governmental restrictions on personal free-
doms when national security is genuinely threatened. In certain in-
stances, governments perceive a true threat to national security and
adopt reasonable ameliorative measures. In many cases, however, the
threat is exaggerated or concocted and the restrictive measures are ex-
cessive or unwarranted. Differentiating among these situations has
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proved to be a difficult task for both domestic judiciaries and interna-
tional observers.
One major problem is informational. To evaluate the factual basis
for a claimed threat to national security and to determine the reasona-
bleness of restrictive measures, judges or observers must have access to
reliable data on both the alleged threat and the actual measures em-
ployed by the government and its agents. Collecting this data is diffi-
cult for all but the national security branches of the government under
scrutiny.
The concept of national security is, moreover, emotive and politi-
cally charged. Governments can easily manipulate public opinion
through the selective release of information and appeals to popular
fears and prejudices. Judges or international observers are often un-
willing to question the authenticity of governmental factual claims on
such sensitive matters. They may also be reluctant to evaluate the pol-
icy judgment of national security officials, particularly when the stan-
dards for assessing national security claims are indeterminate.
Finally, even if governmental claims are critically evaluated, secur-
ing a change in behavior when a government has staked its political
program on a threat to national security can be difficult or impossible.
For these reasons, national security has become the soft under-belly of
liberalism and human rights.
In an effort to analyze current approaches to the evaluation of na-
tional security claims and related infringements on human rights, and
to suggest improvements in these approaches, the Allard K. Lowenstein
International Human Rights Law Project convened a symposium at the
Yale Law School in April, 1982, entitled "Security of the Person and
Security of the State: Human Rights and Claims of National Security."
The Project posed the following questions to symposium participants:
1. What are the claims advanced by state officials when restricting the
freedoms and liberties of individuals on the basis of a threat to na-
tional security, and what underlying circumstances are attendant to
such claims?
2. What policy justifications reasonably may be offered to support dero-
gations from human rights?
3. What restrictions should, in such circumstances, constitute a violation
of human rights?
4. What, until now, has been the approach of domestic and interna-
tional decision-makers to the analysis and resolution of contending
national security and human rights claims?
5. What ought the appropriate response of the international community
be?
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The papers published in this issue of the Yale Journal of World Public
Order are the product of that symposium.
Professor Tapia-Vald~s' paper addresses the first of these questions.
In developing a typology of the relationship between national security
and human rights claims, Professor Tapia-Vald~s distinguishes three
types of national security policies: (1) an outward-oriented policy ad-
dressing itself to external threats of the traditional variety; (2) "national
securitism," under which a broad range of national policies are directed
at securing the nation from exaggerated external and internal subver-
sive threats; and (3) an inward-oriented policy directed by the military
and aimed at purifying the national life of alien moral and political
influences. In a state with an outward-oriented national security pol-
icy, civil rights and liberties are effectively protected by the domestic
constitutional order, and derogations from human rights norms are
strictly confined. A government following a policy of national securit-
ism is likely to retain the formal trappings of constitutionalism, but,
because the executive branch is so dominated by national security con-
cerns, only the courts are available to protect individuals from arbitrary
actions, and then only in cases of extreme misbehavior. Finally, in a
state pursuing an inward-oriented national security policy, pervasive
violations of human rights are committed by an executive branch un-
controlled even by the courts; complaints about government behavior
can be made only in international tribunals. Professor Tapia-Vald~s
argues that international fora are unlikely to prove effective in control-
ling human rights abuses in these latter circumstances, where, regretta-
bly, they are desperately needed.
Professor Tapia-Vald~s' typology apparently does not apply to
human rights infringements in Communist countries or in the countries
of Asia and Africa where the traditions of liberalism are not deeply
ingrained in the national culture. The inward-oriented national secur-
ity type, which might be thought to apply to states in which human
rights are pervasively repressed, is militaristic in nature. It aims at
eradicating the insidious effects of the liberal tradition rather than im-
posing revolutionary change. "National securitism" is apparently a
perversion of a liberal democratic state and does not extend to states
without democratic traditions. We may gather from his footnotes that
Professor Tapia-Vald~s believes that the United States belongs to this
category. But where do countries like Cuba and Singapore fit into this
scheme? Such countries, too, often justify human rights infringements
on national security grounds.
For Professor Adda Bozeman, it is countries apparently excluded
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from Professor Tapia-Vald~s' analysis-countries where Marxism-Len-
inism is the prevailing ideology, or non-Western states where the fun-
damentally European ideology of human rights and democracy is paid
only rhetorical obesiance-which pose the most serious problems for
the pursuit of policies favorable to civil and political rights. In her
view, attempts to impose Western conceptions of human rights on such
states are likely to lead to strategic confusion and counter-productive
do-goodism. Indeed, she argues, propagating Western notions of de-
mocracy and individualism in countries like Singapore and South Ko-
rea may seriously undermine reasonable governmental efforts to
achieve security through the reassertion of trusted values and
institutions.
As Professor Bozeman recognizes, however, much of her argument is
contrary to prevailing international legal trends: since the end of
World War II, states increasingly have bound themselves in domestic
law and international instruments to norms allowing limited deroga-
tions from human rights only where national security is genuinely
threatened. Even if Professor Bozeman's advice were accepted and cer-
tain states designated as beyond the proper scope of these norms, the
problem of applying the norms to Western states would remain. And
while she may think Western power should not be engaged in the pro-
motion of human rights in certain developing and Marxist-Leninist
states, many of these same states have made themselves subject to the
jurisdiction of international supervisory bodies. Thus, the problems of
evaluating national security claims and human rights derogations re-
main compelling.
The next three authors evaluate the jurisprudence of three bodies
that must reconcile national security and human rights claims. Profes-
sor Emerson's paper analyzes and criticizes the jurisprudence of the
U.S. Supreme Court; Professor Schreuer's paper analyzes and generally
applauds the decisions of the European Commission and Court of
Human Rights; and Mr. Walkate's paper reviews the work of the
United Nations Human Rights Committee in implementing the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These papers recom-
mend several devices that can aid judges or other decision-makers in
the discharge of their responsibility to evaluate national security claims
and restrictive measures.
One device is to impose on governments the burden of proof in dem-
onstrating the existence of a specific threat to national security. Profes-
sor Emerson calls this an "equalizing principle" necessary to protect
individual liberties against the pressure of a governmental claim of a
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threat to national security. He suggests that the Supreme Court should
view such claims by the executive branch with "a healthy skepticism,"
given the propensity of governments to claim national security to pro-
tect the narrower interests of officials. Professor Schreuer notes that in
the 1969 Greek Case the European Commission put the burden of
proof on the Greek government to demonstrate the existence of legally
prerequisite conditions for derogating from human rights norms, and
suggests that governments invoking a national security threat should be
required automatically to supply proof of the emergency. Mr. Walkate
similarly concludes that the Human Rights Committee should require
states to substantiate their claims of national security threat.
The imposition on governments of the burden of proving the exist-
ence of a national security threat adequate to justify restrictions on
freedoms and the evaluation of such claims with "healthy skepticism"
are jurisprudential measures with a sound basis in policy. After all, the
invoking government is likely to be the only entity that systematically
can gather information on threats to national security. Proving the ab-
sence of a security threat is not only epistemologically difficult; it may
be a practical impossibility for outside observers or plaintiffs challeng-
ing restrictive measures. Yet the Supreme Court, as Professor Emerson
points out, has often adopted just the opposite approach to national
security claims by the U.S. government. Similarly, in international dis-
course outside of the bodies discussed in these papers, the burden of
establishing the vacuity of those claims is often placed on critics of gov-
ernment claims of national security. Reversing this tendency would
appear to be fundamentally important to the development of an effec-
tive jurisprudence of national security claims.
Another approach to evaluating national security claims is suggested
by Professor Schreuer and Mr. Walkate and was urged in symposium
discussion by Professor Thomas Franck and others. That approach is
to monitor strictly compliance with the procedural requirements of in-
ternational instruments. Professor Schreuer suggests that non-compli-
ance with the notification requirements of the European Convention
should provide prima facie evidence of governmental bad faith. He
also proposes the establishment of a permanent supervisory mechanism
over parties derogating under the Convention. Mr. Walkate urges that
the Human Rights Committee demand scrupulous fulfillment of the
procedural requirements of the Covenant.
One advantage of this procedural emphasis is that it requires govern-
ments to detail the reasons for restricting human rights as well as the
precise limits which have been placed on freedoms. This enables indi-
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viduals to conform their conduct to the local law and limits the discre-
tion of subordinate officials. Furthermore, the interplay between the
dissemination of such information and global political forces opposed
to human rights infringements may cause a more rapid lifting of the
restrictions. Finally, as Professor Franck noted during symposium dis-
cussion, an important advantage of monitoring compliance with the
procedural requirements of human rights instruments is that such mon-
itoring need not involve human rights bodies in criticizing fundamen-
tally the political systems of states invoking national security
justifications. Monitoring procedural compliance enables human rights
bodies to transcend the ideological gulf between Communist and non-
Communist states, and thereby enhance, it is hoped, the observance of
human rights norms in the former. Monitoring of procedural compli-
ance also allows human rights bodies to finesse difficult substantive
questions of when it is legitimate to invoke a national security claim
and what freedoms legitimately may be infringed by invoking
governments.
These substantive questions are, nonetheless, at the heart of the na-
tional security and human rights problem and cannot be resolved
merely through the application of jurisprudential and procedural de-
vices. Symposium participants thus also focused their attention on de-
fining a security threat justifying human rights derogations and on
delineating which rights could be limited in particular circumstances.
Professor Alan Dershowitz noted that, at least in theory, one could im-
agine a proportional scale of national security threats and legitimate
human rights limitations; the more severe the threat, the harsher allow-
able deprivations could be. Framers of the international human rights
instruments have confined this scale at its extremes by defining the
minimum national security threat required to justify any derogations
from the rights provided and by delineating certain rights which under
no circumstances may be infringed. This approach was generally ap-
proved by conference participants, although specific inadequacies were
identified. As Professor Schreuer points out in his paper, the European
Commission and Court of Human Rights have found it somewhat diffi-
cult to apply the requirement of the European Convention that there be
present a "public emergency threatening the life of the nation" to jus-
tify derogations from specified rights. The United Nations Human
Rights Committee seems to have had similar difficulties applying the
analogous provision in the International Covenant. The most difficult
case appears to be Northern Ireland, where the security threat is palpa-
ble but does not threaten the life of the entire nation, that is, the United
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Kingdom. The working definition of the national security threat justi-
fying derogations will likely evolve along the lines suggested in Profes-
sor Schreuer's paper as actual cases arise.
The task of defining non-derogable rights has also proved to be a
continuing one. As governments devise new ways to terrorize their citi-
zenry, international law responds by defining new non-derogable
rights. Kamal Hossein's paper discusses important recommendations
in reports by the International Commission of Jurists and the Interna-
tional Law Association based on analyses of current practices in states
of emergency or exception.
If a state has legitimately invoked a national security threat and is
not derogating from non-derogable rights, the task of determining the
legitimacy of limitations on rights and freedoms becomes even more
difficult. Concepts like proportionality and strict necessity have proved
useful to the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. Pro-
fessor Dershowitz implied that deprivations could be analyzed dimen-
sionally: on the vertical axis, one determines the degree of
infringement of the rights of persons targeted by the government, while
on the horizontal axis, one examines whether the infringements are ex-
cessive in terms of the breadth of the population sectors subjected to
them. Beyond that, symposium participants generally believed that
close attention to contextual factors was the best advice they could offer
to observers responsible for analyzing and evaluating national security
claims and human rights infringements.
Professor Kevin Boyle's paper examines in depth the situation in
Northern Ireland and the response of British governmental organs and
of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights to human
rights abuses. Professor Boyle highlights the special importance of ef-
fective international human rights agencies in situations in which do-
mestic courts are subject to the control of the majoritarian branches of
government. He also outlines a relatively new problem in human
rights protections in times of civil strife, the control of police use of
deadly force. Professor Boyle made a particularly interesting point
during symposium discussion: when civil strife is present, effective
human rights protections are also effective anti-terrorist measures. To
maintain popular support and inhibit terrorist recruitment, govern-
ments must resist the employment of harsh and degrading measures.
Professor Boyle's point suggests that effective international human
rights norms, by inhibiting governments from responding to pressure
for harsher anti-terrorist measures, may themselves make for more ef-
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fective anti-terrorist policies. Human rights and law and order thus
need not be in opposition; rather they are complementary policies.
As Professor Leon Lipson noted in symposium discussion, concen-
tration on derogations under states of emergency may lead observers to
overlook permanently derogating states. These states derogate from
human rights not to cure any temporary national security threat, real or
imagined, but because their basic organization and ideology requires
such derogations. Professor Jordan Paust's paper examines just such
countries. He argues that only states whose politico-ideological
processes match those of a democratic society legally may invoke limi-
tations on rights and freedoms. Moreover, he finds that such docu-
ments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights give this
requirement rather specific content. One-party states, for example,
would not meet the requirement he identifies.
Professor Bassiouni's paper proposes strengthening the enforcement
of human rights norms by establishing international criminal sanctions
for human rights violators. Professor Bassiouni reviews the process by
which criminally-sanctioned international norms develop and suggests
that certain human rights norms are at the stage where criminalization
might emerge. Nonetheless, he urges, caution should be exercised lest
criminalization occur in the absence of effective enforcement mecha-
nisms. He suggests the development of mechanisms to enforce narrow
classes of violations, perhaps on a regional basis, before official conduct
is made criminal. Mr. Hossein suggests an alternative enforcement
mechanism; the creation of a new multilateral credit facility that would
condition loan approval on ratification of and compliance with the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
In light of the papers and discussion at the symposium, what areas
might fruitfully be explored better to understand the relationship be-
tween national security and human rights? One important connection
deserving examination is the relationship between human rights norms
and police expertise regarding the suppression of security threats. Pro-
fessor Boyle alludes several times to the empirical results of measures
adopted by the security forces in Northern Ireland, but most sympo-
sium participants were ill-equipped to judge the efficaciousness of vari-
ous police practices. Clearly, human rights specialists need to be able
to demonstrate that human rights protections are consistent with efforts
to maintain civil order. Even more important, human rights specialists
might be able to enlist security experts in the struggle for effective
human rights protections.
It seems unlikely, after all, that states in most areas are soon going to
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surrender the degree of sovereignty necessary for truly effective human
rights protections. Other approaches must be explored. Perhaps con-
scientious security officials share Professor Boyle's view that human
rights and effective security policies are mutually supportive. The reg-
ularization of police work and the inculcation of respect for human
rights might create important bulwarks against certain repressive meas-
ures. As Professor Leon Lipson noted, the most important human
rights document in most countries is the code of criminal procedure.
Perhaps a future symposium will explore in greater detail the relation-
ship between effective security measures and human rights protections.
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